

Understanding Which New Threats Operators Can Expect To Face Within The Next Two To Five Years To Improve The On-Going Management Of Security Systems

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- ❖ Computer security
- ❖ Computer security + Communications security
- ❖ Information security
- ❖ Information assurance
- ❖ Mission assurance
 - Larger than cyber security

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Things that can go boom
is a game changer

- ❖ Segregate
- ❖ Authenticate
- ❖ Authorize
- ❖ Monitor
- ❖ Contain
- ❖ Adapt

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- Data Access versus System Access
- Human Users versus Machine Users

Opportunistic

Targeted

High Skill

Zero-day attack

Stuxnet

Low Skill

Default passwords

Spear phishing

Opportunistic

Targeted

High Skill

Be better than
your neighbor

??

Low Skill

Basic hygiene

Security awareness

ALLOW GOOD GUYS IN KEEP BAD GUYS OUT

- IP Spoofing predicted in Bell Labs report ≈ 1985
- Unencrypted Telnet with passwords in clear
- 1st Generation firewalls deployed ≈ 1992
- IP Spoofing attacks proliferate in the wild ≈ 1993
- VPNs emerge ≈ late 1990's
- Vulnerability shifts to accessing end-point
- Network Admission Control ≈ 2000's

- Persists as a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) mechanism ≈ 2010's

1. Attackers exist
 - You will be attacked
2. Attackers have sharply escalating incentive
 - Money, terrorism, warfare, espionage, sabotage, ...
3. Attackers are lazy (follow path of least resistance)
 - Attacks will escalate BUT no faster than necessary
4. Attackers are innovative (and stealthy)
 - Eventually all feasible attacks will manifest
5. Attackers are copycats
 - Known attacks will proliferate widely
6. Attackers have asymmetrical advantage
 - Need one point of failure

- A. Prepare for tomorrow's attacks, not just yesterday's
 - Good defenders strive to stay ahead of the curve, bad defenders forever lag
- B. Take care of tomorrow's attacks before next year's attacks
 - Researchers will and should pursue defense against attacks that will manifest far in the future BUT these solutions will deploy only as attacks catch up
- c. Use future-proof barriers
 - Defenders need a roadmap and need to make adjustments
- D. It's all about trade-offs
 - Security, Convenience, Cost