

INFS 766
Internet Security Protocols

Lecture 5
SSL

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
SECURE SOCKETS LAYER
(SSL)

- ❖ **layered on top of TCP**
- ❖ **SSL versions 1.0, 2.0, 3.0, 3.1**
- ❖ **Netscape protocol**
- ❖ **later refitted as IETF standard TLS (Transport Layer Security)**
- ❖ **TLS 1.0 very close to SSL 3.1**

SECURE SOCKETS LAYER (SSL)

- ❖ application protocol independent
- ❖ does not specify how application protocols add security with SSL
 - how to initiate SSL handshaking
 - how to interpret certificates
- ❖ left to designers of upper layer protocols to figure out

SSL ARCHITECTURE



SSL ARCHITECTURE

- ❖ **Handshake protocol: complicated**
 - embodies key exchange & authentication
 - 10 message types
- ❖ **Record protocol: straightforward**
 - fragment, compress, MAC, encrypt
- ❖ **Change Cipher Spec protocol: straightforward**
 - single 1 byte message with value 1
 - could be considered part of handshake protocol
- ❖ **Alert protocol: straightforward**
 - 2 byte messages
 - 1 byte alert level- fatal or warning; 1 byte alert code

SSL/TLS DIFFERENCES

- ❖ **TLS uses HMAC, SSL uses a precursor**
- ❖ **TLS MAC covers compression version field in addition to what SSL MAC covers**
- ❖ **TLS defines additional alert codes**
- ❖ **other minor differences**
- ❖ **TLS has a mode to fall back to SSL**

SSL SERVICES

- ❖ **peer entity authentication**
- ❖ **data confidentiality**
- ❖ **data authentication and integrity**
- ❖ **compression/decompression**
- ❖ **generation/distribution of session keys**
 - **integrated into protocol**
- ❖ **security parameter negotiation**

SSL SESSIONS AND CONNECTIONS

- ❖ **Every connection is associated with one session**
- ❖ **Session can be reused across multiple secure connections**
- ❖ **Handshake protocol**
 - **establishes new session and connection together**
 - **uses existing session for new connection**

SSL SESSION

- ❖ **SSL session negotiated by handshake protocol**
 - **session ID**
 - chosen by server
 - **X.509 public-key certificate of peer**
 - possibly null
 - **compression algorithm**
 - **cipher spec**
 - encryption algorithm
 - message digest algorithm
 - **master secret**
 - 48 byte shared secret
 - **is resumable flag**
 - can be used to initiate new connections

SSL CONNECTION STATE

- ❖ **connection end: client or server**
- ❖ **client and server random: 32 bytes each**
- ❖ **keys generated from master secret, client/server random**
 - **client_write_MAC_secret** **server_write_MAC_secret**
 - **client_write_key** **server_write_key**
 - **client_write_IV** **server_write_IV**
- ❖ **compression state**
- ❖ **cipher state: initially IV, subsequently next feedback block**
- ❖ **sequence number: starts at 0, max $2^{64}-1$**

SSL CONNECTION STATE

- ❖ **4 parts to state**
 - **current read state**
 - **current write state**
 - **pending read state**
 - **pending write state**
- ❖ **handshake protocol**
 - **initially current state is empty**
 - **either pending state can be made current and reinitialized to empty**

SSL RECORD PROTOCOL

- ❖ **4 steps by sender (reversed by receiver)**
 - **Fragmentation**
 - **Compression**
 - **MAC**
 - **Encryption**

SSL RECORD PROTOCOL

- ❖ **each SSL record contains**
 - **content type: 8 bits, only 4 defined**
 - `change_cipher_spec`
 - `alert`
 - `handshake`
 - `application_data`
 - **protocol version number: 8 bits major, 8 bits minor**
 - **length: max 16K bytes (actually $2^{14}+2048$)**
 - **data payload: optionally compressed and encrypted**
 - **message authentication code (MAC)**

SSL HANDSHAKE PROTOCOL

- ❖ **initially SSL session has null compression and cipher algorithms**
- ❖ **both are set by the handshake protocol at beginning of session**
- ❖ **handshake protocol may be repeated during the session**

SSL HANDSHAKE PROTOCOL

- ❖ **Type: 1 byte**
 - 10 message types defined
- ❖ **length: 3 bytes**
- ❖ **content**

SSL HANDSHAKE PROTOCOL





Fig. 1 - Message flow for a full handshake

* Indicates optional or situation-dependent messages that are not always sent.

SSL HANDSHAKE PROTOCOL



Record
Protocol


Fig. 1 - Message flow for a full handshake

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SSL HANDSHAKE PROTOCOL


- ❖ **Phase 1:**
 - Establish security capabilities
- ❖ **Phase 2:**
 - Server authentication and key exchange
- ❖ **Phase 3:**
 - Client authentication and key exchange
- ❖ **Phase 4:**
 - Finish

SSL 1-WAY HANDSHAKE WITH RSA



Record Protocol Fig. 1 - Message flow for a full handshake
 * Indicates optional or situation-dependent messages that are not always sent.

SSL 2-WAY HANDSHAKE WITH RSA



Record Protocol Fig. 1 - Message flow for a full handshake
 * Indicates optional or situation-dependent messages that are not always sent.

SSL HANDSHAKE PROTOCOL

- ❖ these 9 handshake messages must occur in order shown
- ❖ optional messages can be eliminated
- ❖ 10th message explained later
 - hello_request message
- ❖ change_cipher_spec is a separate 1 message protocol
 - functionally it is just like a message in the handshake protocol

SSL HANDSHAKE PROTOCOL

Client		Server
ClientHello	----->	
		ServerHello
		[ChangeCipherSpec]
		Finished
[ChangeCipherSpec]	<-----	
Finished	----->	
Application Data	<----->	Application Data

Fig. 2 - Message flow for an abbreviated handshake

SSL HANDSHAKE PROTOCOL

- ❖ **hello_request (not shown) can be sent anytime from server to client to request client to start handshake protocol to renegotiate session when convenient**
- ❖ **can be ignored by client**
 - **if already negotiating a session**
 - **don't want to renegotiate a session**
 - **client may respond with a no_renegotiation alert**

SSL HANDSHAKE PROTOCOL




Fig. 1 - Message flow for a full handshake

* Indicates optional or situation-dependent messages that are not always sent.

SSL HANDSHAKE: PHASE 1 ESTABLISH SECURITY CAPABILITIES

❖ **client hello**

- **4 byte timestamp, 28 byte random value**
- **session ID:**
 - non-zero for new connection on existing session
 - zero for new connection on new session
- **client version: highest version**
- **cipher_suite list: ordered list**
- **compression list: ordered list**

SSL HANDSHAKE: PHASE 1 ESTABLISH SECURITY CAPABILITIES

❖ **server hello**

- **32 byte random value**
- **session ID:**
 - new or reuse
- **version**
 - lower of client suggested and highest supported
- **cipher_suite list: single choice**
- **compression list: single choice**

SSL HANDSHAKE: PHASE 1 ESTABLISH SECURITY CAPABILITIES

❖ cipher suite

➤ key exchange method

- RSA: requires receiver's public-key certificates
- Fixed DH: requires both sides to have public-key certificates
- Ephemeral DH: signed ephemeral keys are exchanged, need signature keys and public-key certificates on both sides
- Anonymous DH: no authentication of DH keys, susceptible to man-in-the-middle attack
- Fortezza: Fortezza key exchange
we will ignore Fortezza from here on


SSL HANDSHAKE: PHASE 1 ESTABLISH SECURITY CAPABILITIES

❖ cipher suite

➤ cipher spec

- CipherAlgorithm: RC4, RC2, DES, 3DES, DES40, IDEA, Fortezza
- MACAlgorithm: MD5 or SHA-1
- CipherType: stream or block
- IsExportable: true or false
- HashSize: 0, 16 or 20 bytes
- Key Material: used to generate write keys
- IV Size: size of IV for CBC

SSL HANDSHAKE PROTOCOL



Record
Protocol

Fig. 1 - Message flow for a full handshake

* Indicates optional or situation-dependent messages that are not always sent.

SSL HANDSHAKE: PHASE 2 SERVER AUTHENTICATION & KEY EXCHANGE

❖ Certificate message

- server's X.509v3 certificate followed by optional chain of certificates
- required for RSA, Fixed DH, Ephemeral DH but not for Anonymous DH

❖ Server Key Exchange message

- not needed for RSA, Fixed DH
- needed for Anonymous DH, Ephemeral DH
- needed for RSA where server has signature-only key
 - server sends temporary RSA public encryption key to client

SSL HANDSHAKE: PHASE 2 SERVER AUTHENTICATION & KEY EXCHANGE

- ❖ **Server Key Exchange message**
 - signed by the server
 - signature is on hash of
 - ClientHello.random, ServerHello.random
 - Server Key Exchange parameters
- ❖ **Certificate Request message**
 - request a certificate from client
 - specifies Certificate Type and Certificate Authorities
 - certificate type specifies public-key algorithm and use
- ❖ **Server Done message**
 - ends phase 2, always required

SSL HANDSHAKE PROTOCOL




Fig. 1 - Message flow for a full handshake

* Indicates optional or situation-dependent messages that are not always sent.

SSL HANDSHAKE: PHASE 3

CLIENT AUTHENTICATION & KEY EXCHANGE

- ❖ **Certificate message**
 - send if server has requested certificate and client has appropriate certificate
 - otherwise send no_certificate alert
- ❖ **Client Key Exchange message**
 - content depends on type of key exchange (see next slide)
- ❖ **Certificate Verify message**
 - can be optionally sent following a client certificate with signing capability
 - signs hash of master secret (established by key exchange) and all handshake messages so far
 - provides evidence of possessing private key corresponding to certificate

SSL HANDSHAKE: PHASE 3

CLIENT AUTHENTICATION & KEY EXCHANGE

- ❖ **Client Key Exchange message**
 - **RSA**
 - client generates 48-byte pre-master secret, encrypts with server's RSA public key (from server certificate or temporary key from Server Key Exchange message)
 - **Ephemeral or Anonymous DH**
 - client's public DH value
 - **Fixed DH**
 - null, public key previously sent in Certificate Message

SSL HANDSHAKE: POST PHASE 3 CRYPTOGRAPHIC COMPUTATION

❖ 48 byte pre master secret

➤ RSA

- generated by client
- sent encrypted to server

➤ DH

- both sides compute the same value
- each side uses its own private value and the other sides public value


SSL HANDSHAKE: POST PHASE 3 CRYPTOGRAPHIC COMPUTATION

```
master_secret = PRF(pre_master_secret, "master secret",  
                    ClientHello.random + ServerHello.random)  
[0..47];
```

```
pre_master_secret: 48 bytes
```

PRF is composed of a sequence and nesting of HMACs

SSL HANDSHAKE PROTOCOL



Record
Protocol

Fig. 1 - Message flow for a full handshake

* Indicates optional or situation-dependent messages that are not always sent.

SSL HANDSHAKE: PHASE 4 FINISH

- ❖ **Change Cipher Spec message**
 - not considered part of handshake protocol but in some sense is part of it
- ❖ **Finished message**
 - sent under new algorithms and keys
 - content is hash of all previous messages and master secret

SSL HANDSHAKE: PHASE 4 FINISH

❖ Change Cipher Spec message

- 1 byte message protected by current state
- copies pending state to current state
 - sender copies write pending state to write current state
 - receiver copies read pending state to read current state
- immediately send finished message under new current state

SSL HANDSHAKE: PHASE 4 FINISH

Finished message

`verify_data`

```
PRF(master_secret, finished_label, MD5(handshake_messages)+  
SHA-1(handshake_messages)) [0..11];
```

`finished_label`

For Finished messages sent by the client, the string "client finished". For Finished messages sent by the server, the string "server finished".

`handshake_messages`

All of the data from all handshake messages up to but not including this message. This is only data visible at the handshake layer and does not include record layer headers.

SSL ALERT PROTOCOL

❖ 2 byte alert messages

➤ 1 byte level

- fatal or warning

➤ 1 byte

- alert code

SSL ALERT MESSAGES

Warning or fatal

```
close_notify(0),
unexpected_message(10),
bad_record_mac(20),
decryption_failed(21),
record_overflow(22),
decompression_failure(30),
handshake_failure(40),
bad_certificate(42),
unsupported_certificate(43),
certificate_revoked(44),
certificate_expired(45),
certificate_unknown(46),
illegal_parameter(47),
unknown_ca(48),
access_denied(49),
decode_error(50),
decrypt_error(51),
export_restriction(60),
protocol_version(70),
insufficient_security(71),
internal_error(80),
user_canceled(90),
no_renegotiation(100),
```

SSL ALERT MESSAGES

- ❖ **always fatal**
 - **unexpected_message**
 - **bad_record_mac**
 - **decompression_failure**
 - **handshake_failure**
 - **illegal_parameter**

APPLICATIONS AND SSL

- ❖ **use dedicated port numbers for every application that uses SSL**
 - **de facto what is happening**
- ❖ **use normal application port and negotiate security options as part of application protocol**
- ❖ **negotiate use of SSL during normal TCP/IP connection establishment**

APPLICATION PORTS OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL

❖ https	443	❖ ftp-data	889
❖ smtp	465	❖ ftps	990
❖ snntp	563	❖ imaps	991
❖ ldap	636	❖ telnet	992
❖ spop3	995	❖ ircs	993