

INFS 766
Internet Security Protocols

Lecture 10
PKCS

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PKCS

- ❖ **Public-key cryptography standards (PKCS)**
- ❖ **Owned by RSA and motivated to promote RSA**
- ❖ **Created in early 1990's**
- ❖ **Numbered from PKCS1 to PKCS15**
- ❖ **Some along the way have**
 - **lost interest**
 - **folded into other PKCS**
 - **taken over by other standards bodies**
- ❖ **Continue to evolve**

PKCS 1

- ❖ **RSA Cryptography Standard**
 - **Version 2.0 onwards (1998)**
- ❖ **RSA Encryption Standard**
 - **Version 1.5 (1993)**

PKCS 1

- ❖ **Specifies how to use the RSA algorithm securely for encryption and signature**
- ❖ **Why do we need this?**
 - **Padding for encryption**
 - **Different schemes for signature**

PKCS 1

- ❖ **Chosen ciphertext attack based on multiplicative property of RSA**
 - **Attacker wishes to decrypt c**
 - **Choose r , compute $c' = c \cdot r^e \pmod n$**
 - **Get victim to decrypt c' giving $c^d \cdot r \pmod n$**
 - **$c^d \cdot r \cdot r^{-1} \pmod n = c^d \pmod n$**
- ❖ **Padding destroys multiplicative property**

PKCS 1

- ❖ **Version 1.5, 1993**
 - **Encryption padding was found defective in 1998 by Bleichenbacher**
 - **Possible to generate valid ciphertext without knowing corresponding plaintext with reasonable probability of success (chosen ciphertext)**

PKCS 1

❖ Version 2.0, 1998

- Uses Optimal asymmetric encryption protocol (OAEP) by Bellare-Rogoway 1994
 - provably secure in the random oracle model
 - Informally, if hash functions are truly random, then an adversary who can recover such a message must be able to break RSA
 - plaintext-awareness: to construct a valid OAEP encoded message, an adversary must know the original plaintext
- PKCS 1 version 1.5 padding continues to be allowed for backward compatibility
- Accommodation for multi-prime RSA
 - Speed up private key operations

PKCS 1

❖ Cryptographic primitives

❖ Cryptographic scheme

- Encryption scheme
- Signature scheme
 - Signature with appendix: supported
 - Signature with message recovery: not supported

❖ Encoding and decoding

- Converting an integer message into an octet string for use in encryption or signature scheme and vice versa

PKCS 1

❖ Cryptographic primitives

- **Encrypt** $\text{RSAEP}((n,e),m)$
- **Decrypt** $\text{RSADP}((n,d),c)$
- **Sign** $\text{RSASP1}((n,d),m)$
- **Verify** $\text{RSVP1}((n,e),s)$

❖ Basically exponentiation with differently named inputs

PKCS 1

❖ Encryption scheme

- Combines encryption primitive with an encryption encoding method
- message → encoded message → integer message representative → encrypted message

❖ Decryption scheme

- Combines decryption primitive with a decryption decoding method
- encrypted message → integer message representative → encoded message → message

❖ Original version 1.5 scheme and new version 2.0 scheme

PKCS 1

❖ Signature scheme

- Combines signature primitive with a signature encoding method
- message → encoded message → integer message representative → signature

❖ Decryption scheme

- Combines verification primitive with a verification decoding method
- signature → integer message representative → encoded message → message

❖ Original version 1.5 scheme

- Signature with appendix

PKCS 1

❖ The future

❖ Probabilistic signature scheme (PSS)

- Provably secure in random oracle model
- Natural extension to message recovery

PKCS 5

- ❖ **Password-Based Cryptography Standard**
 - **Version 1.5, 1993**
 - **Version 2.0, 1999**
- ❖ **Oriented towards protection of private keys**
- ❖ **Does not specify a standard for password format**

PKCS 5

- ❖ **Password-based key derivation function**
 - **Key = PBKDF(passwd, salt, iteration count)**
- ❖ **salt allows same password to give many keys**
 - **May actually have same password**
 - **Separate dictionary attack for every salt**
- ❖ **Iteration count controls complexity of dictionary attack**

PKCS 5

❖ Version 1.5 PBKDF1

- Key size limited to 160 bits
- Only MD5 and SHA as underlying hash functions
- Assumes key will be used for CBC
- 8-byte salt
- No security proof

PKCS 5

❖ Version 2.0 adds PBKDF2

- Arbitrary length key
- Any underlying hash function, most likely with HMAC
- Salt not fixed at 8 bytes
- Provable security in random oracle model

PKCS 5

❖ Encryption schemes

➤ PBES1

- PBKDF1 with DES or RC2 in CBC

➤ PBES2

- PBKDF2 with some underlying encryption scheme

❖ MAC scheme

➤ PBMAC1

- PBKDF2 with some underlying MAC scheme

PKCS 10

❖ Certification Request Syntax Standard

❖ Specifies format of unsigned certificate requested to be signed

❖ Does not specify format of returned signed certificate

PKCS 10

- ❖ **Version 1.0, 1993**
 - In widespread use
- ❖ **Version 1.5, 1998**
- ❖ **Version 1.7, 2000**
 - Minor changes such as references to PKCS 6 replaced by references to X.509v3

PKCS 10

- ❖ **CertificationRequestInfo**
 - **version**
 - **subjectName**
 - **subjectPublicKeyInfo**
 - **attributes**

PKCS 10

- ❖ **CertificationRequest**
 - **certificationRequestInfo**
 - **signatureAlgorithm**
 - **signature**
- ❖ **Signed with private key corresponding to public key in request**
 - **very RSA specific**
 - **IETF RFC 2511 defines a different format: certificate request message format**

PKCS 8

- ❖ **Private-Key Information Syntax Standard**
 - **Version 1.2, 1993**

PKCS 8

❖ **PrivateKeyInfo**

- **version**
- **privateKeyAlgorithm**
- **privateKey**
- **attributes**

PKCS 8

❖ **encryptedPrivateKeyInfo**

- **encryptionAlgorithm**
- **encryptedData**
 - **privateKeyInfo BER-encoded and encrypted**

❖ **Usually encrypted using PKCS 5**

PKCS 12

- ❖ **Personal Information Exchange Syntax Standard**

- **Version 1, 1999**

- ❖ **Builds on PKCS 8**

- ❖ **Further evolution PKCS 15**

PKCS 12

- ❖ **6 types of information**

- **PKCS 8 shrouded key**

- **Private key**

- **Certificates**

- X.509v3

- SDSI

- **CRLs**

- X.509

- **Secret**

- Whatever

- **Recursive composition of these**

PKCS 12

❖ Each of these can be

- **Plaintext**
- **Enveloped**
 - Encrypted using a secret key which is encrypted using a public key
- **Encrypted**
 - **Secret key encrypted**
 - **Usually password derived**
 - Use PKCS 5 and a password formatting standard which is part of PKCS 12

PKCS 12

❖ The entire stuff is then either

- **Signed**
 - And accompanied with signing certificate
 - **MAC'ed**
 - PKCS 5 based and accompanied with salt and iteration count
- ❖ **Notice: opposite of usual sequence**
- **Encrypt and then authenticate, versus**
 - **Authenticate and then encrypt**

PKCS

DISCONTINUED OR DISINTERESTED

- ❖ **PKCS 2**
 - **discontinued, incorporated into PKCS 1**
- ❖ **PKCS 3**
 - **Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement, 1993**
- ❖ **PKCS 4**
 - **discontinued, incorporated into PKCS 1**

PKCS

TAKEN OVER BY OTHERS

- ❖ **PKCS 6**
 - **Extended Certificate Syntax Standard**
 - **Taken over by X.509v3**
- ❖ **PKCS 7**
 - **Cryptographic Message Syntax Standard**
 - **Taken over by IETF PKIX CMS**

PKCS 9

❖ PKCS 9

- Selected Attribute Types
- For use in PKCS 6, 7, 8, 10

PKCS 11

❖ PKCS 11

- Cryptographic Token Interface Standard
- API used by Netscape (pre 6.0)
- Microsoft CSP (Cryptographic Service Provider) is a competitor

PKCS IN DEVELOPMENT

- ❖ **PKCS 13 (new, in development)**
 - Elliptic Curve Cryptography Standard
 - There are IEEE standards, so not clear why
- ❖ **PKCS 14 (new, in development)**
 - Pseudorandom Number Generation Standard
- ❖ **PKCS 15 (new, in development)**
 - Cryptographic Token Information Format Standard
 - Crypto API neutral

PKCS 11 vs PKCS 15

