

INFS 766
Internet Security Protocols

Lecture 10
PKCS

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PKCS 1

- ❖ Specifies how to use the RSA algorithm securely for encryption and signature
- ❖ Why do we need this?
 - Padding for encryption
 - Different schemes for signature

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PKCS

- ❖ Public-key cryptography standards (PKCS)
- ❖ Owned by RSA and motivated to promote RSA
- ❖ Created in early 1990's
- ❖ Numbered from PKCS1 to PKCS15
- ❖ Some along the way have
 - lost interest
 - folded into other PKCS
 - taken over by other standards bodies
- ❖ Continue to evolve

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PKCS 1

- ❖ Chosen ciphertext attack based on multiplicative property of RSA
 - Attacker wishes to decrypt c
 - Choose r , compute $c' = c \cdot r^e \bmod n$
 - Get victim to decrypt c' giving $c^d \cdot r \bmod n$
 - $c^d \cdot r \cdot r^{-1} \bmod n = c^d \bmod n$
- ❖ Padding destroys multiplicative property

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PKCS 1

- ❖ RSA Cryptography Standard
 - Version 2.0 onwards (1998)
- ❖ RSA Encryption Standard
 - Version 1.5 (1993)

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PKCS 1

- ❖ Version 1.5, 1993
 - Encryption padding was found defective in 1998 by Bleichenbacher
 - Possible to generate valid ciphertext without knowing corresponding plaintext with reasonable probability of success (chosen ciphertext)

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PKCS 1

- ❖ **Version 2.0, 1998**
 - Uses Optimal asymmetric encryption protocol (OAEP) by Bellare-Rogaway 1994
 - provably secure in the random oracle model
 - Informally, if hash functions are truly random, then an adversary who can recover such a message must be able to break RSA
 - plaintext-awareness: to construct a valid OAEP encoded message, an adversary must know the original plaintext
 - PKCS 1 version 1.5 padding continues to be allowed for backward compatibility
 - Accommodation for multi-prime RSA
 - Speed up private key operations

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PKCS 1

- ❖ **Encryption scheme**
 - Combines encryption primitive with an encryption encoding method
 - message → encoded message → integer message representative → encrypted message
- ❖ **Decryption scheme**
 - Combines decryption primitive with a decryption decoding method
 - encrypted message → integer message representative → encoded message → message
- ❖ **Original version 1.5 scheme and new version 2.0 scheme**

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PKCS 1

- ❖ **Cryptographic primitives**
- ❖ **Cryptographic scheme**
 - Encryption scheme
 - Signature scheme
 - Signature with appendix: supported
 - Signature with message recovery: not supported
- ❖ **Encoding and decoding**
 - Converting an integer message into an octet string for use in encryption or signature scheme and vice versa

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PKCS 1

- ❖ **Signature scheme**
 - Combines signature primitive with a signature encoding method
 - message → encoded message → integer message representative → signature
- ❖ **Decryption scheme**
 - Combines verification primitive with a verification decoding method
 - signature → integer message representative → encoded message → message
- ❖ **Original version 1.5 scheme**
 - Signature with appendix

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PKCS 1

- ❖ **Cryptographic primitives**
 - Encrypt $\text{RSAEP}((n,e),m)$
 - Decrypt $\text{RSADP}((n,d),c)$
 - Sign $\text{RSASP1}((n,d),m)$
 - Verify $\text{RSVP1}((n,e),s)$
- ❖ **Basically exponentiation with differently named inputs**

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PKCS 1

- ❖ **The future**
- ❖ **Probabilistic signature scheme (PSS)**
 - Provably secure in random oracle model
 - Natural extension to message recovery

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PKCS 5

- ❖ **Password-Based Cryptography Standard**
 - Version 1.5, 1993
 - Version 2.0, 1999
- ❖ **Oriented towards protection of private keys**
- ❖ **Does not specify a standard for password format**

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PKCS 5

- ❖ **Version 2.0 adds PBKDF2**
 - Arbitrary length key
 - Any underlying hash function, most likely with HMAC
 - Salt not fixed at 8 bytes
 - Provable security in random oracle model

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PKCS 5

- ❖ **Password-based key derivation function**
 - Key = PBKDF(password, salt, iteration count)
- ❖ **salt allows same password to give many keys**
 - May actually have same password
 - Separate dictionary attack for every salt
- ❖ **Iteration count controls complexity of dictionary attack**

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PKCS 5

- ❖ **Encryption schemes**
 - **PBES1**
 - PBKDF1 with DES or RC2 in CBC
 - **PBES2**
 - PBKDF2 with some underlying encryption scheme
- ❖ **MAC scheme**
 - **PBMAC1**
 - PBKDF2 with some underlying MAC scheme

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PKCS 5

- ❖ **Version 1.5 PBKDF1**
 - Key size limited to 160 bits
 - Only MD5 and SHA as underlying hash functions
 - Assumes key will be used for CBC
 - 8-byte salt
 - No security proof

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PKCS 10

- ❖ **Certification Request Syntax Standard**
- ❖ **Specifies format of unsigned certificate requested to be signed**
- ❖ **Does not specify format of returned signed certificate**

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PKCS 10

- ❖ **Version 1.0, 1993**
 - In widespread use
- ❖ **Version 1.5, 1998**
- ❖ **Version 1.7, 2000**
 - Minor changes such as references to PKCS 6 replaced by references to X.509v3

PKCS 8

- ❖ **Private-Key Information Syntax Standard**

- Version 1.2, 1993

PKCS 10

- ❖ **CertificationRequestInfo**
 - version
 - subjectName
 - subjectPublicKeyInfo
 - attributes

PKCS 8

- ❖ **PrivateKeyInfo**
 - version
 - privateKeyAlgorithm
 - privateKey
 - attributes

PKCS 10

- ❖ **CertificationRequest**
 - certificationRequestInfo
 - signatureAlgorithm
 - signature
- ❖ **Signed with private key corresponding to public key in request**
 - very RSA specific
 - IETF RFC 2511 defines a different format: certificate request message format

PKCS 8

- ❖ **encryptedPrivateKeyInfo**
 - encryptionAlgorithm
 - encryptedData
 - privateKeyInfo BER-encoded and encrypted
- ❖ **Usually encrypted using PKCS 5**

PKCS 12

- ❖ **Personal Information Exchange Syntax Standard**
 - Version 1, 1999
- ❖ **Builds on PKCS 8**
- ❖ **Further evolution PKCS 15**

PKCS 12

- ❖ **The entire stuff is then either**
 - **Signed**
 - And accompanied with signing certificate
 - **MAC'ed**
 - PKCS 5 based and accompanied with salt and iteration count
- ❖ **Notice: opposite of usual sequence**
 - **Encrypt and then authenticate, versus**
 - **Authenticate and then encrypt**

PKCS 12

- ❖ **6 types of information**
 - **PKCS 8 shrouded key**
 - **Private key**
 - **Certificates**
 - X.509v3
 - SDSI
 - **CRLs**
 - X.509
 - **Secret**
 - Whatever
 - **Recursive composition of these**

PKCS DISCONTINUED OR DISINTERESTED

- ❖ **PKCS 2**
 - **discontinued, incorporated into PKCS 1**
- ❖ **PKCS 3**
 - **Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement, 1993**
- ❖ **PKCS 4**
 - **discontinued, incorporated into PKCS 1**

PKCS 12

- ❖ **Each of these can be**
 - **Plaintext**
 - **Enveloped**
 - Encrypted using a secret key which is encrypted using a public key
 - **Encrypted**
 - **Secret key encrypted**
 - **Usually password derived**
 - Use PKCS 5 and a password formatting standard which is part of PKCS 12


PKCS TAKEN OVER BY OTHERS

- ❖ **PKCS 6**
 - **Extended Certificate Syntax Standard**
 - **Taken over by X.509v3**
- ❖ **PKCS 7**
 - **Cryptographic Message Syntax Standard**
 - **Taken over by IETF PKIX CMS**

PKCS 9

- ❖ **PKCS 9**
 - Selected Attribute Types
 - For use in PKCS 6, 7, 8, 10

PKCS 11 vs PKCS 15



PKCS 11

- ❖ **PKCS 11**
 - Cryptographic Token Interface Standard
 - API used by Netscape (pre 6.0)
 - Microsoft CSP (Cryptographic Service Provider) is a competitor

PKCS IN DEVELOPMENT

- ❖ **PKCS 13 (new, in development)**
 - Elliptic Curve Cryptography Standard
 - There are IEEE standards, so not clear why
- ❖ **PKCS 14 (new, in development)**
 - Pseudorandom Number Generation Standard
- ❖ **PKCS 15 (new, in development)**
 - Cryptographic Token Information Format Standard
 - Crypto API neutral