

On the Feasibility of Attribute-Based Access Control Policy Mining

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Abstract

As the technology of attribute-based access control (ABAC) matures and begins to supplant earlier models such as role-based or discretionary access control, it becomes necessary to convert from already deployed access control systems to ABAC. Several variations of this general problem can be defined, some of which have been studied by researchers. In particular the ABAC policy mining problem assumes that attribute values for various entities such as users and objects in the system are given, in addition to the authorization state, from which the ABAC policy needs to be discovered. In this paper, we formalize the ABAC RuleSet Existence problem in this context and develop an algorithm and complexity analysis for its solution. We further introduce the notion of ABAC RuleSet Infeasibility Correction along with an algorithm for its solution.

1 Introduction

The attribute-based access control (ABAC) policy mining problem [9, 12] requires the discovery of ABAC policy from a given authorization state and given attribute values for users and objects. We use the terms ABAC policy and ABAC rule set interchangeably. Various means of providing authorization input data have been considered, including RBAC [10], log data [11] and sparse log [2]. The previous literature has primarily focused on the detailed mechanics of generating ABAC policy rules from the provided input. Here we develop a more abstract and general characterization of this problem. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first such study of ABAC policy mining.

The fundamental question investigated in this paper concerns the feasibility of finding a suitable ABAC policy, assuming there is no limit to the sophistication of the ABAC policy language. Consider two extreme cases. In the first, all users have identical attribute values and likewise for all

objects. Rules based on attribute values thereby cannot distinguish any two user, object pairs and can only give uniform authorization for all such pairs, which is hardly useful in practice. At the other extreme assume user identity and object identity are included as attribute values for users and objects respectively, where identity is globally unique. Every user, object pair is thereby distinguishable from every other pair, so authorization for each pair can be differentiated. In general, the inclusion of identity attributes will guarantee the existence of ABAC policy rules even if all other attributes are ignored. We believe that identity attributes are antithetical to the spirit of ABAC and we disallow them, which makes the feasibility question germane.

Rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 formalizes the ABAC RuleSet Existence problem. Section 3 develops a solution for this problem with associated proofs and analysis. Section 4 discusses the treatment of unrepresented attribute value combinations. Section 5 introduces the ABAC RuleSet Infeasibility Correction problem and provides a solution. A brief discussion of related works is presented in Section 6.

2 ABAC RuleSet Existence Problem

We consider access control systems that mediate access of users to objects. We specifically omit the user-subject distinction, e.g. as in [4]. Given that a user requests to perform an operation on an object, every access control system must define a `checkAccess` function to decide whether or not this operation should be permitted or denied.

Definition 1 `checkAccess`

`checkAccess`: $U \times O \times OP \rightarrow \{\text{True}, \text{False}\}$ where, U , O , and OP are finite sets of users, objects, and operations, respectively. A user $u \in U$ is allowed to perform operation $op \in OP$ on object $o \in O$ if and only if `checkAccess`(u, o, op) is True.

In general, the `checkAccess` function changes with the

system state. Since our focus is on a single state we omit explicit mention of the state. The specification of checkAccess , typically as a logical formula, depends upon the details of the underlying access control model. A simple authorization system, where user-object-operation tuples are used directly to control access is as follows.

Definition 2 Enumerated Authorization System (EAS)

An EAS is a tuple $\langle U, O, OP, AUTH, \text{checkAccess}_{AUTH} \rangle$ where, $U, O,$ and OP are finite sets of users, objects and operations, respectively. Here, $AUTH \subseteq U \times O \times OP,$ is a specified authorization relation and $\text{checkAccess}_{AUTH}(u, o, op) \equiv (u, o, op) \in AUTH.$

For instance, user Paul can read F if and only if $(\text{Paul}, F, \text{read}) \in AUTH,$ whereby $\text{checkAccess}_{AUTH}$ is True. We require that the authorization state in the ABAC policy mining problem be given as an EAS. Note that however checkAccess is specified in an access control system, an equivalent AUTH relation can be computed for finite sets of users, objects and operations. So this is a reasonably general assumption.

Our ABAC model is adapted from [4] with two major deviations. Firstly, as mentioned above we omit the user-subject distinction. Secondly, attributes in [4] can be atomic-valued or set-valued. For example, the age attribute of a user is atomic valued. On the other hand a user’s department attribute could be atomic valued if only one department is permitted or set-valued if a user can be in multiple departments. Note that set-valued attributes can be replaced by atomic-valued attributes by simply enumerating all combinations and assigning a symbol for each. For simplicity we assume all attributes are atomic valued.

In ABAC, authorization of whether a user can do an operation on an object is decided using the attributes value assignments of both user and object. (Many ABAC systems also include contextual attributes, which we ignore in this paper.) The core of ABAC is a set of rules, which constitute the ABAC policy.

Definition 3 ABAC policy

An ABAC policy, POL_{ABAC} is a tuple, $\langle OP, UA, OA, RangeSet, RuleSet \rangle$ where,

- OP is a finite set of operations, and UA and OA are finite sets of user and object attribute function names respectively. We assume $UA \cap OA = \emptyset.$
- $RangeSet = \{ (att, value) \mid att \in (UA \cup OA) \wedge value \in Range(att) \}$ where, $Range(att)$ specifies a finite set of atomic values.
- $RuleSet$ is a set of rules, where, for each operation $op,$ $RuleSet$ contains a single rule, $Rule_{op}.$ Formally, $RuleSet = \{ Rule_{op} \mid op \in OP \}.$ Each $Rule_{op}$ is specified

using the grammar below.

$$\begin{aligned}
 Rule_{op} &::= Rule_{op} \vee Rule_{op} \mid (Atomicexp) \\
 Atomicexp &::= Atomicuexp \wedge Atomicoexp \mid Atomicuexp \mid \\
 &\quad Atomicoexp \mid True \mid False \\
 Atomicuexp &::= Atomicuexp \wedge Atomicuexp \mid uexp \\
 Atomicoexp &::= Atomicoexp \wedge Atomicoexp \mid oexp \\
 uexp &\in \{ ua(u) = value \mid ua \in UA \wedge value \in \\
 &\quad Range(ua) \} \\
 oexp &\in \{ oa(o) = value \mid oa \in OA \wedge value \in \\
 &\quad Range(oa) \}
 \end{aligned}$$

Each $Rule_{op}$ is specified with user u and object o as formal parameters. The semantics of $Rule_{op},$ evaluated for an actual user a and object b is given in Definition 4. For example, ABAC rule for read operation is denoted by, $Rule_{read}$ and given by $(rank(u) = manager \wedge type(o) = attendance \log) \vee (rank(u) = manager \wedge type(o) = Annual \text{ report}).$ Here any user in U with $rank = manager$ can read both types of objects, attendance log and annual report.

A complete ABAC system defines authorization based on ABAC policy as follows.

Definition 4 ABAC system

An ABAC system is a tuple, given by, $\langle U, O, UAValue, OAValue, POL_{ABAC}, \text{checkAccess}_{ABAC} \rangle$ where,

- U and O are finite sets of users and objects, respectively. $OP, UA, OA, RangeSet$ and POL_{ABAC} are defined as in Definition 3.
- $UAValue = \{ UAValue_{ua} \mid ua \in UA \}$ where, $UAValue_{ua} : U \rightarrow Range(ua)$ such that $UAValue_{ua}(u)$ returns the value of attribute ua for user $u.$ For convenience, we understand $ua(u)$ to mean $UAValue_{ua}(u).$
- $OAValue = \{ OAValue_{oa} \mid oa \in OA \}$ where, $OAValue_{oa} : O \rightarrow Range(oa)$ such that $OAValue_{oa}(o)$ returns the value of attribute oa for object $o.$ For convenience, we understand $oa(o)$ to mean $OAValue_{oa}(o).$
- $\text{checkAccess}_{ABAC}(a:U, b:O, op:OP) \equiv Rule_{op}(a:U, b:O)$ where $Rule_{op}$ is as stated in Definition 3. Given any user $a \in U$ along with attribute value assignments $ua(a),$ where $ua \in UA$ and an object $b \in O$ along with attribute value assignment $oa(b),$ where $oa \in OA,$ the expression $Rule_{op}(a, b)$ is evaluated by substituting the values $ua(a)$ for $ua(u)$ and $oa(b)$ for $oa(o)$ in the $Rule_{op}$ expression. User a is permitted to do operation op on object b if and only if $Rule_{op}(a, b)$ evaluates to True.

We also define a **partially defined ABAC system** to be a tuple, $\langle U, O, UAValue, OAValue, POL_{ABAC-RuleSet} \rangle$ where $POL_{ABAC-RuleSet}$ is a tuple $\langle OP, UA, OA, RangeSet \rangle$ where $OP, UA, OA,$ and $RangeSet$ are as in Definition 3 and $RuleSet$ is undefined.

Table 1. Example data set 1

(a) UAValue			(b) OAValue		(c) Range	
User	ua1	ua2	Object	oa1	ua1	{F, G}
u1	F	C	o1	F	ua2	{B, C, D}
u2	F	B	o2	G	oa1	{F, G}
u3	F	C				
u4	G	D				

Definition 5 Equivalency

An EAS, $\langle U, O, OP, AUTH, \text{checkAccess}_{AUTH} \rangle$, and an ABAC system, $\langle U, O, UAValue, OAValue, POL_{ABAC}, \text{checkAccess}_{ABAC} \rangle$ with identical U, O , and OP are said to be equivalent iff, $\text{checkAccess}_{AUTH}(u, o, op) \iff \text{checkAccess}_{ABAC}(u, o, op)$ for all $u \in U, o \in O$, and $op \in OP$.

Based on the foregoing, ABAC RuleSet Existence problem is defined as follows.

Definition 6 ABAC RuleSet Existence problem

Given, an EAS $\langle U, O, OP, AUTH, \text{checkAccess}_{AUTH} \rangle$ and a partially defined ABAC system $\langle U, O, UAValue, OAValue, POL_{ABAC}\text{-RuleSet} \rangle$ where U, O and OP are identical to the given EAS, does there exist a RuleSet so that the resulting ABAC system is equivalent to the given EAS? Such a RuleSet, if it exists, is said to be a suitable RuleSet.

To illustrate the ABAC RuleSet Existence problem consider the example data in Table 1, where $U = \{u1, u2, u3, u4\}$, $O = \{o1, o2\}$, $UA = \{ua1, ua2\}$ and $OA = \{oa1\}$. Table 1(c) specifies the attribute ranges while Tables 1(a) and (b) gives attribute values for users and objects respectively. All of this specifies a partially defined ABAC system. Suppose we are given an EAS with $AUTH = \{(u1, o1, op)\}$. A suitable RuleSet cannot exist since users $u1$ and $u3$ cannot be distinguished based on their attribute values. However, if $AUTH = \{(u1, o1, op), (u3, o1, op)\}$ then a suitable RuleSet is $ua1(u)=F \wedge ua2(u)=C \wedge oa1(o)=F$.

3 ABAC RuleSet Existence Solution

The essential concept to solve the ABAC RuleSet Existence problem is that the attribute name, value combinations induce a partition on the set of user, object pairs. We formalize this intuition as follows.

Definition 7 Binary relation R

Given, a partially defined ABAC system, $\langle U, O, UAValue, OAValue, POL_{ABAC}\text{-RuleSet} \rangle$, the binary relation R on set $UO = U \times O$ is defined as

$$R \equiv \{((u1, o1), (u2, o2)) \mid (\forall ua \in UA. ua(u1) = ua(u2)) \wedge (\forall oa \in OA. oa(o1) = oa(o2))\}$$




Figure 1. Partition set example.

Lemma 1 R is an equivalence relation.

Proof: Trivial by inspection.

The resulting partitions induced by R on UO are formally referred to as follows.

Definition 8 Partition set P

Let $P = \{P_1, P_2, \dots, P_n\}$ be the equivalence classes of R . Each $P_i \in P$ is called a partition element (or simply partition) and P is called the partition set. Each $P_i \in P$ is identified by a unique collection of (attribute name, value) pairs, given by $PV(P_i)$ where,

$$PV(P_i) \equiv \text{For any } (u1, o1) \in P_i, (UV(u1) \cup OV(o1))$$

$$UV(u:U) \equiv \{(ua, value) \mid ua \in UA \wedge value = ua(u)\}$$

$$OV(o:O) \equiv \{(oa, value) \mid oa \in OA \wedge value = oa(o)\}$$

For instance, using the example data in Table 1, $UO = \{(u1, o1), (u1, o2), (u2, o1), (u2, o2), (u3, o1), (u3, o2), (u4, o1), (u4, o2)\}$. The resulting partition set is shown in Fig. 1. The PV set for the partition containing $(u1, o1)$ and $(u3, o1)$ is $\{(ua1, F), (ua2, C), (oa1, F)\}$.

Finally, we introduce the following notion.

Definition 9 Conflict-free partition

Given an EAS, $\langle U, O, OP, AUTH, \text{checkAccess}_{AUTH} \rangle$ and partition set P , a $P_i \in P$ is conflict-free with respect to a specific $op \in OP$ iff the following statement is true,

$$(\forall (u, o) \in P_i. (u, o, op) \in AUTH) \vee (\forall (u, o) \in P_i. (u, o, op) \notin AUTH)$$

P_i has conflict with respect to $op \in OP$ otherwise. Partition set P is conflict-free iff for all $op \in OP$, every $P_i \in P$ is conflict-free with respect to op . P is called a conflicted partition set, otherwise.

An example of conflict-free partition set is presented in Fig. 1 where, user-object pairs in bold black belong to $AUTH$ with respect to $OP = \{op\}$, while others are not. By inspection, all partitions in Fig. 1 are conflict-free with respect to given $AUTH$ and $op \in OP$. Hence, resulting partition set is conflict-free. The concept of conflict-free partitions is used to solve ABAC RuleSet Existence problem as follows.

Theorem 1 Given an ABAC RuleSet Existence problem instance, a suitable RuleSet exists iff P is conflict-free.

Proof:

Only if part is proved by contraposition. If P is not conflict-free, by definition, a conflict partition $P_i \in P$ with respect to a specific $op \in OP$, contains some $(u, o) \in P_i$ which are permitted in AUTH, while others are not. Since all $(u, o) \in P_i$ are represented by same $PV(P_i)$, these two logical parts of P_i cannot be separated using UAValue and OAValue. Thereby, $Rule_{op}$ generation is not possible. Note that this only if proof is independent of the actual policy language for $Rule_{op}$.

If part is proved by constructing a suitable RuleSet and showing that, if P is conflict-free then resulting ABAC system with generated RuleSet is equivalent to EAS. By definition, RuleSet contains a $Rule_{op}$, for each $op \in OP$. For a $op \in OP$, $Rule_{op}$ is given by:

$$Rule_{op} = \bigvee_{P_i \times \{op\} \subseteq AUTH} (uexp(PV(P_i)) \wedge oexp(PV(P_i)))$$

$$uexp(PV(P_i)) = \bigwedge_{(ua, value) \in PV(P_i)} (ua(u) = value)$$

$$oexp(PV(P_i)) = \bigwedge_{(oa, value) \in PV(P_i)} (oa(o) = value)$$

To prove equivalency between the resulting ABAC system with RuleSet and EAS, it is necessary and sufficient to show that, for a specific op in OP , $(a, b, op) \in AUTH \iff Rule_{op}(a, b)$, for all $a \in U, b \in O$.

To prove the only if part: by inspection, each $(u, o) \in U \times O$ belongs to only one partition in P. Let $(a, b) \in P_i$. Since P is conflict-free, corresponding $P_i \times \{op\}$ must be a subset of AUTH. By construction, $Rule_{op}$ includes a conjunctive clause for every $P_i \times \{op\} \subseteq AUTH$, which evaluates to True for any user-object pair in P_i . Since $Rule_{op}$ is a disjunction of such conjunctive clauses, thereby, $Rule_{op}(a, b)$ evaluates to True. Hence, only if part is proved.

To prove if part: by inspection, if $Rule_{op}(a, b)$ evaluates to True, then there must be a conjunctive clause of $Rule_{op}$, which is evaluated to True. By construction, each such conjunctive clause in $Rule_{op}$ is representing a specific $P_i \in P$ where, $P_i \times \{op\} \subseteq AUTH$. Since P is conflict-free, every user-object pair in corresponding P_i is permitted with respect to op , thus belongs to AUTH. Thereby, $(a, b, op) \in AUTH$, which proves if part.

Hence, given P is conflict-free, generated suitable RuleSet completes the ABAC system equivalent to given EAS.

Based on this result, a formal algorithm for ABAC RuleSet existence problem is presented in Algorithm 1.

Corollary 1 Complexity of Algorithm 1 is $O(|OP| \times |U| \times |O|)$.

Algorithm 1 ABAC RuleSet Existence Algorithm

Require: EAS, Partially defined ABAC system where U, O, and OP are identical to EAS

Ensure: Partition set P and SUCCESS or FAILURE

```

1: Partition P := ∅
2: while ∃(u, o) ∈ U × O do
3:   if ∃Pi ∈ P.PV(Pi) = (UV(u) ∪ OV(o)) then
4:     Pi := Pi ∪ {(u, o)}
5:   else
6:     Create new Pi = {(u, o)}
7:     P := P ∪ Pi
8:   U × O := U × O - {(u, o)}
9: while ∃op ∈ OP.∃Pi ∈ P.!(Pi × {op} ⊆ AUTH) ∨
  (Pi × {op} ⊆  $\overline{AUTH}$ ) do
10:  return FAILURE
11: return SUCCESS

```

Proof:

Given an equivalence relation R as in definition 7, the complexity of partition set P generation is $O(|U| \times |O|)$, considering partition creation, search, and insertion operations take constant time. For each $op \in OP$, checking whether P is conflict-free or not, requires $O(|OP| \times |U| \times |O|)$ as the maximum number of possible partition is $(|U| \times |O|)$. Hence, the overall complexity is $O(|OP| \times |U| \times |O|)$. Note that the size of any attribute range does not impact this complexity.

Simple rule generation will be illustrated with an example presented in Fig. 1. Since P is conflict-free with respect to given AUTH, using the rule construction procedure listed in Theorem 1, corresponding conjunctive clauses for each $P_i \in P$ where $P_i \times \{op\} \subseteq AUTH$ in Fig. 1 are $\langle ua1(u) = F \wedge ua2(u) = C \wedge oa1(o) = F \rangle$, $\langle ua1(u) = F \wedge ua2(u) = B \wedge oa1(o) = F \rangle$, $\langle ua1(u) = G \wedge ua2(u) = D \wedge oa1(o) = F \rangle$, and $\langle ua1(u) = G \wedge ua2(u) = D \wedge oa1(o) = G \rangle$. By construction, $Rule_{op}$ consists of disjunction of all the conjunctive clauses listed here. Now, any rule simplification approach can be used for further minimization.

4 Unrepresented partitions

Given range of attributes and a specific set of attribute value assignment to users and objects, it is quite possible that some attribute value combinations will not show up while generating partition set. We call these partitions as “unrepresented”, since the range of attributes clearly allows presence of those, but due to the peculiarity in the given user and object attribute value assignment, these partitions remain empty. For instance, all possible attribute value combinations (each one represents a possible partition) for Table 1 data is given by {FCF, FBF, GDF, GDG, FCG, FBG,

FDG, FDG, GBF, GCF, GBG, GCG}, considering an order of $\langle ua1, ua2, oa1 \rangle$. Only first six combinations of this set are present, while the remaining six are unrepresented according to the given data. The ABAC policy mining approaches in [9, 12] ignore unrepresented partitions, whereby the generated rules may or may not authorize these attribute value combinations to have access. If these unrepresented partitions get populated in future, this may lead to unexpected checkAccess decisions.

To have an insight using the same data set for ABAC policy mining where authorizations are presented in Fig. 1, [12] derives two rules without user and object id, $\langle true, true, \{op\}, \{ua1=oa1\} \rangle$ and $\langle ua1=\{G\}, true, \{op\}, \emptyset \rangle$. Since [12] works fine for all possible user-object pair, first four of the attribute value combinations are allowed, while FCG and FBG are denied. Amongst unrepresented attribute value combinations, $\{GCG, GBG, FDF\}$ satisfies the first clause of the rule, and $\{GBF, GCF, GBG, GCG\}$ are accepted by the second clause. Only $\{FDG\}$ gets rejection according to the generated rules! The question of unrepresented attribute combinations is treated as a rule simplification concern, rather than a security concern in [12]. Another approach in [9] generates two rules, $\langle (oa1 = F) \rangle$ and $\langle (ua2 = D) \rangle$ and works fine for given authorizations. In case of unrepresented partition, $\{FDF, FDG, GBF, GCF\}$ gets acceptance, while $\{GBG, GCG\}$ is denied. This mixed response shows “don’t care” for unrepresented attribute value combinations again. The security architect should be at least aware of these unrepresented combinations. He might decide to don’t care, or take suitable action based on his expertise. In our approach of the previous section unrepresented partitions are assumed to have deny access which is a conservative and safe security posture.

5 ABAC RuleSet Infeasibility Correction

We know from Section 3 that if the partition set is conflicted a suitable RuleSet cannot exist. There are at least two approaches to dealing with this situation in practice. One approach is to construct RuleSets that are only approximately equivalent to the given AUTH relation. Various notions of approximation can be defined and their security implications analyzed. The second approach, which we study in this paper, is to introduce additional attributes to reconcile the conflicted partitions. This leads us to introduce the following notion.

Definition 10 ABAC RuleSet Infeasibility Correction problem

Given, EAS $\langle U, O, OP, AUTH, checkAccess_{AUTH} \rangle$ and a partially defined ABAC system with unspecified RuleSet where, U, O, and OP are identical to the given EAS such that the partition set P is conflicted, the ABAC RuleSet Infeasibility Correction problem is to 1) add new attributes

UA and/or OA, and 2) assign appropriate values to the added new attributes, so that it is possible to generate a suitable RuleSet.

Ideally, the newly added attributes should have semantic significance grounded in the underlying application domain, and should be assigned meaningful values appropriate to different users and objects. This will presumably require expert input from security architects, perhaps aided by artificial intelligence, machine learning and other automated techniques. Study of such approaches is beyond the scope of this paper. Here we investigate a purely automated approach which introduces new “artificial” attributes with “artificial” values.

We note that conflict-free partitions that are authorized for access with respect to an operation op can have rules generated as explained in the proof of Theorem 1, ignoring consideration of any new attributes. However, the conflicted partitions need to be further refined by means of these new attributes to remove the conflict. There can be many ways to do this. Clearly the minimum possible split of a conflicted partition is into two refined partitions, one with all user-object pair permitted for op while the second contains the denied ones. The maximum possible split is to put each tuple in the conflicted partition into its own refined partition. One possible approach to constructing appropriate refinements is described below.

Given ABAC RuleSet Infeasibility Correction instance, consider a $P_i \in P$ which is conflicted with respect to some $op \in OP$. Define the binary relation R_{P_i} on P_i as:
 $R_{P_i} \equiv \{((u1, o1), (u2, o2)) | \forall o \in O. \forall op \in OP. ((u1, o, op) \in AUTH \Leftrightarrow (u2, o, op) \in AUTH) \wedge \forall u \in U. \forall op \in OP. ((u, o1, op) \in AUTH \Leftrightarrow (u, o2, op) \in AUTH)\}$

Lemma 2 R_{P_i} is an equivalence relation.

Proof: Trivial by inspection.

Hence, R_{P_i} induces a partition on P_i .

Definition 11 Partition set S_i

Let S_i be the partition on P_i induced by R_{P_i} and denoted by $S_i = \{S_{i1}, S_{i2}, \dots, S_{im}\}$, where $1 \leq m \leq |P_i|$. Each $S_{ik} \in S_i$ is called a partition element (or shortly partition) and S_i is called partition set. By definition of R_{P_i} , each $S_{ik} \in S_i$ is represented by a collection of (attribute name, value) pairs, $PV(S_{ik})$ where,
 $PV(S_{ik}) \equiv \text{For any } (u1, o1) \in S_i, (UV(u1) \cup OV(o1))$

The concept of conflict-free partition from Section 3 is extended to S_i .

Definition 12 Conflict-free partition set S_i

Given an EAS, $\langle U, O, OP, AUTH, checkAccess_{AUTH} \rangle$ and partition set S_i stated in definition 11, a $S_{ik} \in S_i$ is conflict-free with respect to a specific $op \in OP$ and given AUTH in

Table 2. Example data set 2

(a) UAValue		(b) OAValue		(c) Range of attributes	
User	uat1	Object	oat1	uat1	{F, G}
u1	F	o1	F	oat1	{F, G}
u2	F	o2	F		
u3	F	o3	F		
u4	G	o4	G		
u5	G				




Figure 2. Refined partition set example.

EAS, iff the following statement is true:

$$(\forall (u,o) \in S_{ik}. (u,o,op) \in AUTH) \vee (\forall (u,o) \in S_{ik}. (u,o,op) \notin AUTH)$$

S_{ik} has conflict with respect to $op \in OP$ otherwise. Partition set S_i is conflict-free with respect to given AUTH in EAS iff for all $op \in OP$, every $S_{ik} \in S_i$ is conflict-free with respect to op .

Fig. 2 shows the resulting partitions for Table 2 where, bold black user-object pairs belong to AUTH with respect to $OP = \{op\}$ and rest are not. Here, $U = \{u1, u2, u3, u4, u5\}$, $O = \{o1, o2, o3, o4\}$, $UA = \{uat1\}$, $OA = \{oat1\}$, and Table 2 shows user attribute value assignment (UAValue), object attribute value assignment (OAValue), and range of attributes in (a), (b), and (c), respectively. To make visual comparison, the dotted rectangles in Fig. 2 shows partition set P for Table 2 as defined in Section 3. The leftmost conflicted partition is refined into four sub-partitions.

Lemma 3 Given a conflict partition $P_i \in P$ with respect to $op \in OP$, the following holds:

- S_i is conflict-free
- S_i refines P_i
- For all $S_{ik} \in S_i$, $PV(S_{ik})$ is the same

Proof:

By inspection of definition S_i , it is conflict-free. S_i refines

P_i because for each $S_{ik} \in S_i$, $S_{ik} \subseteq P_i$. Since each $P_i \in P$ is identified by a unique $PV(P_i)$ and S_i does the refinement only, therefore, for all $S_{ik} \in S_i$, $PV(S_{ik})$ is same and (c) follows.

Definition 13 Given a partition $P_i \in P$, let $uList_i$ and $oList_i$ denote the sets of users and objects present in P_i . Let $uList_i$ be further partitioned as follows: any two users $u1, u2 \in uList_i$ belong to same partition iff $\forall op \in OP. \forall o \in O. (u1, o, op) \in AUTH \iff (u2, o, op) \in AUTH$. Let this assumption split $uList_i$ into q partitions, denoted by $\{ul_{i1}, \dots, ul_{iq}\}$. Similarly let $oList_i$ be partitioned as follows: any two objects $o1, o2 \in oList_i$ belong to same partition iff $\forall op \in OP. \forall u \in U. (u, o1, op) \in AUTH \iff (u, o2, op) \in AUTH$. Let this assumption split $oList_i$ into r partitions, denoted by $\{ol_{i1}, \dots, ol_{ir}\}$.

Lemma 4 $S_i = \{ul_{i1}, \dots, ul_{iq}\} \times \{ol_{i1}, \dots, ol_{ir}\}$.

Proof: Trivial by inspection of definitions.

Definition 14 Introducing new user and object attributes

If P_i is a conflict partition, the following steps are proposed where, UND specifies ‘‘Unknown’’ status of an attribute value assignment.

- $UA = UA \cup exU$ and $OA = OA \cup exO$ where, exU and exO are new user and object attributes, respectively. Initially, for all $u \in U$, $exU(u) := UND$ and for all $o \in O$, $exO(o) := UND$.
- To ensure clarity, $PV_{new}(S_{ik} \in S_i)$ is introduced.
 $PV_{new}(S_{ik}) \equiv \text{For any } (u1, o1) \in S_{ik}, (UV_{new}(u1) \cup OV_{new}(o1))$
 $UV_{new}(u:U) \equiv \{(ua, value) | ua \in (UA \cup exU) \wedge value = ua(u)\}$
 $OV_{new}(o:O) \equiv \{(oa, value) | oa \in (OA \cup exO) \wedge value = oa(o)\}$
 Here, $Range(exU)$ and $Range(exO)$ are sets of unique random values where $Range(exU) \cap Range(exO) = \emptyset$. The sets of random values are chosen so that new attribute and corresponding range can be added in an automated manner without human provided input.
- Given a $P_i \in P$, algorithm 2 is used to assign appropriate values to the newly added attributes. Inside partitionCorrection, each of the q partitions $\in \{ul_{i1}, \dots, ul_{iq}\}$ is assigned a unique random value from $Range(exU)$. Hence, every user in the same partition gets the same exU value. Similarly, each of the r partitions $\in \{ol_{i1}, \dots, ol_{ir}\}$ is assigned a unique random value from $Range(exO)$. Hence, every object in the same partition gets the same exO value.

Note: By Definition 13, $uList_i$ and $oList_i$ is further partitioned using universal quantifications on the sets U ,

Algorithm 2 PartitionCorrection

Require: Conflict partition P_i and corresponding ABAC Ruleset Infeasibility Correction instance

Ensure: Refined partition set S_i where each $PV_{\text{new}}(S_{ik} \in S_i)$ is unique

```
1:  $uL := \{u_{l1}, \dots, u_{lq}\}$  //Def. 13
2:  $oL := \{o_{l1}, \dots, o_{lr}\}$  //Def. 13
3: if  $\exists u \in uList_i.exU(u) = \text{UND}$  then
4:   while  $\exists partu \in uL$  do
5:      $uRandom := v \in \text{Range}(exU)$  such that  $\forall u \in U \setminus partu.exU(u) \neq v$ 
6:     For all  $u1 \in partu$ ,  $exU(u1) := uRandom$ 
7:      $uL := uL \setminus partu$ 
8:   if  $\exists o \in oList_i.exO(o) = \text{UND}$  then
9:     while  $\exists parto \in oL$  do
10:       $oRandom := v \in \text{Range}(exO)$  such that  $\forall o \in O \setminus parto.exO(o) \neq v$ 
11:      For all  $o1 \in parto$ ,  $exO(o1) := oRandom$ 
12:       $oL := oL \setminus parto$ 
13:   return  $S_i // \{u_{l1}, \dots, u_{lq}\} \times \{o_{l1}, \dots, o_{lr}\}$ 
```

O, and OP. Thereby, regardless of conflict partitions, once the exU and exO values are assigned by algorithm 2, they remain unchanged throughout the entire Rule-Set generation process.

Lemma 5 Based on Definition 14, for each $S_{ik} \in S_i$, $PV_{\text{new}}(S_{ik})$ is unique.

Proof: Follows trivially from Lemma 4 and Definition 14.

For instance, given a conflict partition, P_i in Fig. 2 where only $(u1, o1)$ belongs to AUTH with respect to op , it is refined into four new partitions. Initially, $uList_i$ is $\{u1, u2, u3\}$ and $oList_i$ is $\{o1, o2, o3\}$. According to Algorithm 2, $uList_i$ is further partitioned into $\{\{u1\}, \{u2, u3\}\}$. Similarly, $oList_i$ is further partitioned into $\{\{o1\}, \{o2, o3\}\}$. The resulting refined partitions has same PV, given by $\{(uat1, F), (oat1, F)\}$. According to Definition 14 and Algorithm 2, let exU value for $\{u1\}$ and $\{u2, u3\}$ be 1 and 2, respectively. Similarly, $\{o1\}$ and $\{o2, o3\}$ are assigned 3 and 4 for exO , respectively. Thereby, resulting unique PV_{new} value for the refined partitions are $\{(uat1, F), (oat1, F), (exU, 1), (exO, 3)\}$, $\{(uat1, F), (oat1, F), (exU, 1), (exO, 4)\}$, $\{(uat1, F), (oat1, F), (exU, 2), (exO, 3)\}$, and $\{(uat1, F), (oat1, F), (exU, 2), (exO, 4)\}$, respectively.

Theorem 2 Given, an ABAC RuleSet Infeasibility Correction problem instance, it is always possible to find a suitable RuleSet such that the resulting ABAC system is equivalent to given EAS.

Proof:

The theorem will be proved by construction. For a specific $op \in OP$, $Rule_{op}$ construction steps are as follows. It is as-

sumed that, partition set P construction does not depend on exU and exO .

1. Each conflict-free partition $P_i \in P$ is included in $Rule_{op}$ as conjunctive clause (same as Theorem 1) where, $P_i \times \{op\} \subseteq \text{AUTH}$.
2. Each conflict partition $P_i \in P$ is refined by Definitions 13 and 14, which generate conflict-free partitions only and ensure that for each such $S_{ik} \in S_i$, $PV_{\text{new}}(S_{ik})$ is unique. For each of the resulting partition $S_{ik} \in S_i$, a conjunctive clause is included in $Rule_{op}$ only if $S_{ik} \times \{op\} \subseteq \text{AUTH}$. For conflict partitions only, $Rule_{op}$ is given by:

$$Rule_{op} = \bigvee_{P_i \in cp(P)} (uexp(PV_{\text{new}}(S_{ik})) \wedge oexp(PV_{\text{new}}(S_{ik})))$$

where $cp(P) = \{P_i \in P \text{ is a conflict partition}\}$, $S_{ik} \in \text{partitionCorrection}(P_i)$, and $S_{ik} \times \{op\} \subseteq \text{AUTH}$.

$$uexp(PV_{\text{new}}(S_{ik})) = \bigwedge_{(ua, value) \in PV_{\text{new}}(S_{ik}) \wedge ua \in UA \cup exU} (ua(u) = value)$$

$$oexp(PV_{\text{new}}(S_{ik})) = \bigwedge_{(oa, value) \in PV_{\text{new}}(S_{ik}) \wedge oa \in OA \cup exO} (oa(o) = value)$$

Here, $Rule_{op}$ is disjunction of all the conjunctive clauses generated in step 1 and 2. By definition, $RuleSet$ contains a $Rule_{op}$, for each $op \in OP$. Hence, $RuleSet$ can be generated. To prove equivalency between the resulting ABAC system with $RuleSet$ and EAS, it is necessary and sufficient to show that, for a op in OP , $(a, b, op) \in \text{AUTH} \iff Rule_{op}(a, b)$ where $a \in U, b \in O$.

To prove the only if part: by inspection, $(a, b) \in U \times O$ belongs to only one partition, a $P_i \in P$. If P_i is conflict-free with respect to op then $P_i \times \{op\}$ must be a subset of AUTH. Hence, step 1 works. If P_i is a conflict partition, step 2 works. Let, $(a, b) \in S_{ik}$ where, $S_{ik} \in S_i$. Hence, $S_{ik} \times \{op\}$ must be a subset of AUTH. Since $Rule_{op}$ is disjunction of all the conjunctive clauses generated in step 1 and 2, thereby, $Rule_{op}(a, b)$ evaluates to true. Hence, only if part is proved. To prove if part: by inspection, if $Rule_{op}(a, b)$ evaluates to true, then there must be a conjunctive clause of $Rule_{op}$, which is evaluated to true. By construction, each such conjunctive clause in $Rule_{op}$ is representing a specific partition where partition $\times \{op\} \subseteq \text{AUTH}$. Since each such partition is conflict-free, every user-object pair in corresponding partition is permitted with respect to op , thus belongs to AUTH. Thereby, $(a, b, op) \in \text{AUTH}$, which proves if part. Hence, it can be concluded that generated suitable $RuleSet$ proposed by the steps above, completes the ABAC system, and equivalent to given EAS.

Based on last example, two partitions $\{(u1, o1)\}$, and $\{(u4, o4), (u5, o4)\}$ are included in $Rule_{op}$. Hence, $Rule_{op}$

is $(uat1(u) = F \wedge oat1(o) = F \wedge exU(u) = 1 \wedge exO(o) = 3) \vee (uat1(u) = G \wedge oat1(o) = G)$ and the RuleSet is $\{Rule_{op}\}$. In this example, both exU and exO are used for RuleSet Infeasibility Correction. If every user in U is represented by distinct user attribute value combination, exU is not required. The same condition holds for objects and exO .

Asymptotic complexity of ABAC RuleSet Infeasibility Correction is $O(|OP| \times (|U| \times |O|)^3)$. Given a partition set P with conflict, checking whether each $P_i \in P$ is conflict-free or not takes $O(|OP| \times (|U| \times |O|))$. If a $P_i \in P$ is in conflict with respect to a $op \in OP$, Algorithm 2 is called to refine P_i only. Inside Algorithm 2, corresponding list of users in P_i is further partitioned by comparing each user-user pair, hence takes $O(|U|^2)$ complexity. Similarly, list of objects in P_i is partitioned; hence takes $O(|O|^2)$ complexity. Since a partition cannot have more than $|U|$ users and $|O|$ objects, while loops inside PartitionCorrection have upper bound $O(|U|)$ and $O(|O|)$, respectively. Hence, overall asymptotic complexity of PartitionCorrection algorithm is $O((|U| \times |O|)^2)$. Thereby, overall complexity is given by $O(|OP| \times (|U| \times |O|)^3)$.

6 Related works

To the best of our knowledge, feasibility notion of Attribute-Based Access Control policy mining problem has been formally studied for the first time in this paper. Hence, there are no previous works directly related to this problem. However, there exist notable previous works on the field policy mining, such as rule mining, role mining [6, 8], ABAC policy mining, Relationship-Based Access Control (ReBAC) mining [1], and so on. ABAC policy mining problem was first introduced formally in [12]. Given an access control list policy as input, [12] finds out equivalent ABAC policy. Here, ABAC rule is a tuple specifying sets of users, objects, operations, and constraints involving user and objects attributes. Although constraints give more generalized rule, but only a few forms of constraints are allowed in this paper. Another work with authorization data as input is [9]. Despite having the same asymptotic complexity, [9] shows better performance with respect to total execution time. In [9], two algorithms for ABAC policy mining, ABAC-FDM, and ABAC-SRM have been proposed. ABAC-FDM is accurate but due to its exponential complexity, more efficient ABAC-SRM is proposed. An out of the box approach is given in [3], which deals with positive as well as negative ABAC rules. This work basically depends on PRISM, an existing rule mining algorithm.

Based on variety of the input, some other notable ABAC policy mining works are: RBAC [10], log data [11] and sparse log [2]. A deep learning approach towards ABAC policy mining from logs using Restricted Boltzmann Machine (RBM) has been presented in [7]. Apart from these

works, an evolutionary computation approach for ABAC policy mining is presented in [5], based on incremental learning of single rules and search-optimizing features.

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