



Extended ReBAC Administrative Models with Cascading Revocation and Provenance Support

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- "... a new paradigm of access control needs to be developed that is based on interpersonal relationships ..."
 -- [Gates 2007]
- Relationship-based Access Control (ReBAC) determines access in terms of the relationships among users and resources
- Inspired by the rapid emergence of online social networks
- Exemplary work includes:
 - [Carminati 2009a, 2009b]
 - [Fong 2009]
 - [Fong 2011a, 2011b, Bruns 2012]
 - [Cheng 2012a, 2012b, 2014]
 - [Crampton 2014, Stoller 2015, Rizvi 2015, Crampton 2016]





- Demand for an appropriate administrative model
 - Dynamic and decentralized nature of OSNs
 - Multiple owners and administrators
 - Proper control on adding and removing of entities, relationships, and policies
- Use ReBAC itself to manage ReBAC
 - Economy of mechanism
 - Prior success of using Role-based Access Control (RBAC) to manage RBAC





- J. Crampton and J. Sellwood, Path Conditions and Principal Matching: A New Approach to Access Control, SACMAT 2014.
- RPPM: <u>relationships</u>, <u>paths</u>, and <u>principal</u>-<u>matching</u>
- Combines UNIX access control model, ReBAC, and RBAC
- Path Condition
 - Bind requests to principals
- Principal Matching
 - Replace a path between entities with a single edge labelled by a principal





- S. Stoller, An Administrative Model for Relationship-Based Access Control, **DBSec 2015**.
- RPPM²: RPPM Modified
- Administrative Model
 - Add and Delete Edges/Entities/Authorization Rules
 - The administration of authorization rules is considered the most challenging
 - Economy of mechanism





- S. Rizvi, P. Fong, J. Crampton and J. Sellwood, *Relationship-Based Access Control for OpenMRS*, SACMAT 2015.
- Enforce ReBAC in a production-scale system
- Administrative Model
 - Add and remove access control relationships
 - Enabling precondition and applicability precondition



Motivation




- Extend Administrative ReBAC
- Use Case: Configure MT-RBAC
 RBAC extension with multi-tenancy authorization
- Three motivating problems:
 - Enforce Global Integrity Policy Checks
 - Address Cascading Revocation
 - Resolve Multiple-ownership Issue









Multi-tenant RBAC Model Structure







- Introduction and Motivation
- AReBAC Models 1, 2 and 3
- Experiments
- Conclusion







- Supports two operations: Add or Remove Edges (a.k.a. Relationships)
- Consistency Policies:
 - The system graph G = (V; E) is always well-formed after allowing admin operation.
- Global Integrity Constraints:
 - Constraints based on certain conditions for participants.



AReBAC₁ (cont.)



• Operations

 $\mathcal{A}dd(\mathbf{e}_{admin}, \mathbf{e}_{1}, \mathbf{e}_{2}, \mathbf{r}) \triangleleft$ $\mathbf{e}_{admin} \in V \land \mathbf{e}_{1} \in V \land \mathbf{e}_{2} \in V \land$ $\mathbf{r} \in R \land (\tau(\mathbf{e}_{1}), \tau(\mathbf{e}_{2}), \mathbf{r}) \in E_{PR}$ $E' = E \cup \{\langle \mathbf{e}_{1}, \mathbf{e}_{2}, \mathbf{r} \rangle\} \triangleright$ $\mathcal{R}M(\mathbf{e}_{admin}, \mathbf{e}_{1}, \mathbf{e}_{2}, \mathbf{r}) \triangleleft$ $\mathbf{e}_{admin} \in V \land (\mathbf{e}_{1}, \mathbf{e}_{2}, \mathbf{r}) \in E$ $E' = E - \{\langle \mathbf{e}_{1}, \mathbf{e}_{2}, \mathbf{r} \rangle\} \triangleright$

Policy

$$p = \mathsf{OP}(e_{admin}, e_1, e_2, r) \leftarrow \mathsf{enableC}(e_{admin}, e_1, e_2) \land \mathsf{preC}(e_1, e_2)$$


Examples

Operation	Enabling Pre-Condition	Applicability Pre-Condition
$\mathcal{A}dd(\text{tenant}_1, \text{tenant}_1, \text{tenant}_2, \text{TT})$	True	True
$\mathcal{R}M(\text{tenant}_1, \text{user}_1, \text{role}_1, \text{UA})$	$user \cdot UO \cdot tenant \wedge role$	True
	$\cdot \ RO \cdot tenant$	
$\mathcal{A}dd(\text{tenant}_2, \text{tenant}_2, \text{user}_2, \text{UO})$	True	$(-, \operatorname{user}_2, \operatorname{UO}) \notin \mathrm{E}$





• The operation will trigger a series of recursive removal of edges on the graph in addition to the direct consequence of the operation.









• Policy:

 $p = \mathcal{R}M(e_{admin}, e_1, e_2, r) \leftarrow \mathsf{enableC}(e_{admin}, e_1, e_2) \land$ $\mathsf{preC}(\mathbf{e}_1, \mathbf{e}_2) : \mathcal{C}_{revoke}(\mathbf{e}_1, \mathbf{e}_2, \mathbf{r}).$

• Crevoke(e₁, e₂, r) returns a set of edges that needs to be removed (possibly empty) when the policy *p* is used to authorize the edge removal operation.





- Identification of dependent edges is non-trivial
 Maintaining dependency relations could be costly
- Dependent-edge Discovery Algorithm
 - Depth-first search (O(V+E))
 - Dependency mapping function (O(1))
 - Maps the dependency edge (e_1 , e_2 , *label*) to an ordered set of relationship labels *Path*, and a set of dependent relationship labels R_d

Overall complexity is O(V+E)






- The provenance of a piece of data is the process that led to that piece of data
- Causality dependencies record the flow of transactions in the system
- The Open Provenance Model (OPM) captures such causality dependencies and expresses them in the provenance graph
- We can use provenance to address the multiownership issue



Edges with Multiple Ownership





*: provenance data updated








- Use provenance information to capture and express causality dependencies for assisting authorization.
 - Independent from ReBAC formalization
 - Extensible to enable Provenance-based Access Control (PBAC)
 - Potentially facilitate *multi-level* cascading revocation
 - Provenance vs typed parameters
 - More complicated and costly
 - More expressive power and richer information



OPM Graph for Adding UA Edge








OPM Graph for Removing UA Edge








Experiments



• Experiment 1: Varied size of *Path*, fixed size of *rSet*






Experiments (cont.)



• Experiment 2: Fixed size of *Path*, varied size of *rSet*





Conclusion



- Proposed a family of three administrative ReBAC models based on RPPM² policy language
- Identified and addressed three problems
 - Integrity constraints
 - Cascading revocation
 - Multi-ownership of edges
- Provided a dependent-edge discovery algorithm
- Used the proposed models to capture MT-RBAC
- Next:
 - Investigate new problems about ReBAC administration
 - Policy administration
 - Synthesize ReBAC and PBAC, etc.



Questions? Comments?



